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This is a report of the hearing that took place on Friday 15th April 2016, from  
14.00-16.30hrs. This was the tenth session in the ‘LSE Commission on the future of  
Britain in Europe’ series.
The hearing began with two keynote presentations:
•  Simon Glendinning (Professor of European Philosophy, LSE), ‘The Teleology of  
European Union’
•  Antonio Armellini (Former Permananet Representative of Italy to the OECD; former 
spokesman for EC Commissioner Altierio Spinelli), ‘Time for two Europes’
A broad range of experts and practitioners were invited to participate in the discussion. 
These included guests with senior experience of political office and diplomacy; leaders of 
policy think-tanks; senior journalists; and consultants and academics. For the discussion,  
we were keen to have contributions from a variety of perspectives in order to explore  
our theme in different contexts and in relation to different interests. There were  
different views of the history of European integration, different views of the political 
and legal significance of the idea of “ever closer union”, and different views on 
Britain’s relationship to all of these. This report synthesises the discussion and is a fair 
representation of its findings.
We are very grateful for the expert contributions and for the additional papers submitted 
in parallel to the hearing by both participants and non-participants. Together, the material 
provided high quality evidence on which to draw conclusions. The hearing adopted the 
‘Chatham House’ rule on not attributing comments to individuals in any public statement 
afterwards, and this rule is respected here.
Marion Osborne and David Spence provided excellent organisational support and help 
putting together our panellists. Roch Dunin-Wąsowicz helped greatly with the wider 
preparation for the hearing, and comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors in 
this report are my sole responsibility.
Simon Glendinning
Professor of European Philosophy, European Institute, LSE.
   Foreword
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1. Introduction
How should the phrase “Ever Closer Union” (often referred to here simply as “the phrase”) 
be understood? This question deserves to be explored both conceptually and historically, 
and its significance across various fields identified: the history of the phrase throughout 
the process of European integration; its impact on British political thought with regard 
to the EU; and the wording and ramifications of the negotiated opt-out from it for the 
United Kingdom.
Two very general, and intertwined, dimensions deserve special attention: the idea of 
a basic heading or direction of travel of European integration; and the history of the 
interpretation of that basic heading. In the hearing, those dimensions were developed  
and explored though four main discussion themes occupying four parts of the hearing.
The first part of the hearing covered the history of these words, from the time they 
first appeared in the process of European integration, up to but not including the UK 
renegotiation of its commitment to this principle in 2016. The second part was devoted 
to how the words have been portrayed in the media, especially in the UK leading up 
to the 2016 renegotiation. The third part consisted of a reflection on the resonance of 
the words in the European Parliament, both in terms of a critical reflection from MEPs 
and its more general political significance for Europe’s legislative body. The fourth part 
detailed the appearance and nonappearance of the phrase (and its parts) in the rulings 
of the European Court of Justice and was aimed at determining its legal significance for 
furthering European integration.
2.  Summary
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The conclusions of the hearing’s discussions 
were that: 
•  The phrase “ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe” has its origins 
in a political project of establishing a 
supranational government in Europe. 
However, while its formulation is 
explicitly teleological (directed towards 
a certain end) the history of European 
integration cannot be described 
as having been governed by that 
teleology. 
•  The EU and its predecessors are the 
result of an ongoing creative project in 
the making. It had been assumed in its 
first phases that this would be a gradual 
process towards political union, but it 
is now accepted that some Member 
States might be more integrated than 
others. After the 2016 renegotiation 
there is no requirement for the UK 
to move towards deeper political and 
economic integration. The EU is now an 
effectively multi-speed union without a 
single “final destination”.
•  Historically the idea of “Ever Closer 
Union” was conceived as a way of 
overcoming the pathologies of  
national state formations, rooted  
in a commitment to peace through  
the internationalisation of politics.  
The “federal” ambition has not 
disappeared from the politics of 
European Union, but the idea of the 
nation state (as such) as the source 
of international conflict is no longer 
widely accepted.
•  UK media representation of the 
EU, though usually focused on 
disseminating rudimentary information, 
often equates “Ever Closer Union” with 
an ideological, hegemonic, and supra-
nationalist European political project.
•  The idea of “Ever Closer Union” is a 
significant political touchstone for 
parliamentary politics on the EU level, 
which thereby takes a distinctively 
different shape than the groupings 
in national parliaments. Indeed, 
along with the traditional Left/Right 
dichotomy, it is an axis of ideological 
divide in the EP chamber in a way it is 
nowhere else.
•  The idea of “Ever Closer Union” is not 
an explicit driver of the ECJ rulings, 
even if it has appeared in them from 
time to time. Had the Court been 
barred from using or even tacitly 
appealing to the phrase, it most 
likely would have reached the same 
conclusions in the 57 occasions when 
the words actually appeared in its 
rulings (57 out of 29,969 rulings).
•  As a Member of the EU a state may 
both enhance the sovereignty it retains, 
and have a say in the development 
and powers of the union in those areas 
where sovereignty is shared or pooled. 
“Having a say” in this project includes 
what, if anything, is to be understood 
by the phrase “Ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe”. The 2016 
renegotiations should be understood in 
this light.
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3. The Concept of Ever Closer Union
Talk of “Ever Closer Union” is, of course, 
a contraction of the full enigmatic 
formulation: “Ever closer union of the 
peoples of Europe”. This is enigmatic 
because it holds together two features 
of the European Union that seem to be 
intractable, irreducible and contradictory. 
First, it seems to contain an internal 
tension within it between the singularity 
of a “union” and the plurality of 
“peoples”. And, second, it seems to sustain 
an ambiguity over whether it concerns 
(primarily) a political body aiming to 
cultivate conditions for closer cultural or 
spiritual relationships between peoples, 
call that a union of minds, or a political 
body aiming at closer political relationships 
between nations, call that a union of 
governments.
However, what is at issue in any way 
of understanding the phrase is the 
idea of moving ever closer towards 
something. This idea, the idea of a 
purposive movement towards some end 
or goal makes the phrase fundamentally 
teleological in character. Accordingly, a 
basic question concerns how one should 
understand the telos of “Ever Closer 
Union”. With respect to the ambiguity 
already noted, the teleological direction 
might be thought as either conditions 
of ever closer understanding and 
cooperation between the (especially but 
not exclusively national) “peoples” of 
Europe (a union of minds); or a movement 
of transformation of governments from a 
plurality of national governments towards 
a supranational government (a union of 
governments).
Both of these interpretations have been 
defended in the theoretical literature on 
the emergence in Europe of a “political 
body” beyond Europe of the nations. 
Both have their roots in the writings of 
the philosopher Immanuel Kant, and his 
early anticipation and prediction of the 
emergence in Europe of “a great political 
body of the future, without precedence 
in the past”. The first interpretation 
is probably Kant’s own. It is the idea 
of political institutions which create 
sustainable conditions of co-operation  
and understanding between the peoples 
of Europe that makes war between  
the nations increasingly “less likely”.  
The second interpretation is illustrated by 
the work of the contemporary philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas who construes the 
European project as a movement towards 
the creation of an international or 
supranational state in Europe. In 2013, 
for example, he called on today’s Member 
States to take steps, as soon as possible, 
toward what he calls “a supranational 
democracy”: an international state which 
is formed by a fundamental “transfer of 
competences from the national to the 
European level”. He proposed a common 
economic government for Europe where 
nations could preserve their identity 
within a supranational democracy by 
retaining the role of the “implementing 
administration” of decisions made at the 
supranational level.
These two interpretations of “Ever 
Closer Union” need not be thought 
of as mutually exclusive. Habermas, in 
particular, would urge that the first 
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telos (a union of minds) is best achieved 
through the development of the second 
(a union of governments). It is clear, 
however, that Kant thought the latter 
ambition, if taken to its logical end in a 
European government, would prove an 
unworkable disaster. A stable and lasting 
European government would require the 
existence of a European “demos”, and 
that prospect looks stubbornly distant 
at best. So Kant recommended instead 
a unique and historically unprecedented 
“federation of free states” as the best way 
of institutionally cultivating the first goal. 
The two conceptions of institutional 
design in view in these two interpretations 
of the telos of union were strikingly 
present in the differences between 
the first draft and the second draft of 
the renegotiation achieved by the UK 
government in February 2016 under the 
title of “Sovereignty”. The original draft 
of the text proposed by Cameron and 
Tusk outlines a clear telos of “trust and 
understanding among peoples living in 
open and democratic societies sharing a 
common heritage of universal values” and 
yet stipulates that it is not “equivalent to 
the objective of political integration”. In a 
fascinating development, this formulation 
did not survive into the final text. It was 
replaced by a lengthier, and much more 
legalistic one, focused almost entirely on 
the UK’s “opt-out” of any further political 
integration, should it take place. The final 
document “recognised that the United 
Kingdom, in the light of the specific 
situation it has under the Treaties, is not 
committed to further political integration 
into the European Union”. It also outlined 
that Treaties remain the only source of 
legitimation of the Union and “do not 
compel all Member States to aim for a 
common destination”, leaving the telos 
of ‘Ever Closer Union’ undefined, but the 
possibility of deeper integration among 
some Member States strongly implied. 
The original tension between unity 
and plurality of the ambition for “ever 
closer union among the peoples of 
Europe” clearly remains here – but it is 
now expressed differentially rather than 
internally: some peoples within the Union 
might be more integrated than others.  
The general tension is nevertheless 
retained in what one might call its 
voluntarism: there is no requirement for 
Member States to move towards deeper 
political and economic integration; it 
therefore remains dependent on whether 
nations desire it, and should some Member 
States desire it, then they are free to 
pursue it. Should others (not only the 
UK) not desire it, they are not obliged 
or compelled to do so. The possibility 
is affirmed here of a multi-speed union 
without a single telos.
IMAGE SEARCH
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Whether the telos of “Ever Closer Union” 
is conceived as a union of minds or of 
governments the renegotiation showed for 
the first time that today there is no shared 
vision of a single telos of union among 
the 28 Member State of the EU. Or, at 
least, no single aim of political integration 
common to them all. The reality today 
revealed by the negotiation is that there 
are in fact different “tiers” of European 
Union integration: a tier focused around 
the Eurozone and increasingly common 
economic government and deeper political 
integration (which may or may not survive 
in the form of a single group); a tier 
focused on commitments to an increasingly 
single-market; and a tier from the post-
Communist European Member States who 
are rediscovering their own sovereignty at 
the same time as engaging in a process of 
European integration, and still deciding 
their path in the Union.
These developments raise important 
questions about the historical character 
of the Union itself, and indicate that its 
understanding of its own (ideal) historical 
telos changes in the course of its own 
(actual) history of making and attaining 
new institutional conditions. One should 
then distinguish between supposing that 
there is a fixed normative horizon when 
we speak of either a “union of minds” or a 
“union of governments”, and a processual 
movement between what has been 
attained in either respect and what is then 
regarded as attainable: a sense of historical 
development where the path and horizon 
moves as we do. 
The general historical “scansions” of the 
history of the European political project 
become crucial. The main feature of its 
early development was a hope among 
many that there would be a rapid 
movement towards an international state. 
The basic political motivation for this was 
the conviction, powerfully reinforced 
by the experience of nationalism and 
wars among the nations of Europe, 
that national political formations are 
intrinsically pathological and should be 
replaced by a more rational international 
system that would be effectively immune 
to them. The hope for rapid development 
did not last into the era of “functionalism” 
where a slower step-by-step approach 
was taken: the EU taking over certain 
national functions in the expectation 
that there would be a logic of successive 
developments in different areas “pulled” 
into play by the earlier transfers of 
competences to the European level.
There was a conviction, 
powerfully reinforced by the 
experience of nationalism and 
wars among the nations of 
Europe, that national political 
formations are intrinsically 
pathological and should be 
replaced by a more rational 
international system that 
would be effectively immune 
to them.
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Both of these models preserved a supra-
national or “federalist” telos as their guiding 
ambition: the movement towards a union of 
governments. However, during the course 
of the second half of the twentieth century 
the idea of the nation state as an intrinsically 
problematic political form began to lose its 
hold on the political imagination. Instead, 
it was increasingly widely believed that it 
was not the form of the nation-state as 
such that was the problem but the form of 
government within that state. In particular, 
the pathologies were strongly connected 
to authoritarian, totalitarian and otherwise 
non-democratic regimes. A democratic 
nation-state, by contrast, was regarded as an 
instrument of peace and security both within 
itself and between such states.
This shift powerfully altered the “horizon” 
of thinking about the ends of European 
Union. Federalism no longer appeared 
to be the only rational ambition of “Ever 
Closer Union” (though many cleaved to 
that idea and still do), and in its place a 
new “mantra” – with a new corresponding 
telos – has appeared to have taken hold 
within many national governments and 
on some of those working within the EU 
institutions: “National where possible, 
European where necessary”. This new 
formulation is, of course, open to different 
teleological interpretations, but it seems 
clearly to indicate a significant historical 
mutation within the unfolding historical 
development of the European Union as a 
political project. It is also a mutation that 
the UK should feel comfortable with.
The now known reality of a differentiated 
union with overlapping circles of 
engagement and perhaps with multi-speed 
elements means that there is a delicate 
equilibrium in place. If Britain departed, 
the vision of Europe as an area of free-
trade in a single-market would have 
considerably diminished force within the 
EU, and there would be pressure, especially 
on countries in the Eurozone, to make 
a decision over the extent of economic 
and political union that they would be 
prepared to accept or want. Further opt-
outs might be sought by various states, 
perhaps especially from post-communist 
countries unlikely to want to give up 
only recently acquired independence and 
sovereignty. The EU could start unravelling 
– not in one go, but gradually, in the way 
of the Holy Roman Empire. 
At this stage in its history the EU is now 
faced with the alternative of either 
altogether abandoning the idea of 
supranational union in favour of a form of 
intergovernmental cooperation that finds 
agreement to pool or share sovereignty 
where it can; or of an EU of two Europes, 
one pushing towards political union 
and centred on the Euro, and another 
based on market rationalization, but 
both existing independently and not 
adversarially within a broader European 
Union. The first alternative is a movement 
towards a more Kantian model, aiming 
primarily at optimising co-operation and 
understanding between the peoples of 
free states; the second, a simultaneous 
hybrid of two very different visions, 
one stronger than Kant’s (a union of 
governments) and one rather weaker (a 
trading bloc).
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4. The Historical Emergence of the Phrase
At the end of World War Two there was 
an upsurge in feeling for the Kantian idea 
that peace could be secured only through 
world government constituted by regional 
federations. In Europe the watchword for 
reconciliation was, in the words of Winston 
Churchill, “a kind of United States of 
Europe”. 
This movement for European unity was 
supported by the USA, and the Marshall 
Plan was intended to assist this process. 
Britain blocked the Marshall scheme from 
leading to a European federal treasury, 
but led the way for the formation of the 
Council of Europe (1949). While it was not 
an organization that served as a building 
block of the future European Union, it 
has been one of its spiritual forerunners. 
The Council of Europe that established 
the European Human Rights regime, to 
which all EU Member States must subscribe 
to, was an initiative that Britain fully 
supported. 
  Article 1a. The aim of the Council of 
Europe is to achieve a greater unity 
between its Members for the purpose 
of safeguarding and realizing the ideals 
and principles which are their common 
heritage and facilitating their economic 
and social progress.
  Statute of the Council of Europe, 
London, 5th May 1949
Under the guidance of Jean Monnet it was 
the European Coal and Steel Community 
established by the Treaty of Paris (1951) 
that took up the ambition for a rapid 
movement towards a kind of United States 
of Europe. The preamble of this nascent 
European treaty laid the foundation for 
the introduction of “Ever Closer Union” 
in the Treaty of Rome (1957), officially the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC), that Britain did not take 
part in. 
  CONSIDERING that world peace may 
be safeguarded only by creative efforts 
equal to the dangers which menace it; 
CONVINCED that the contribution which 
an organized and vital Europe can 
bring to civilization is indispensable to 
the maintenance of peaceful relations; 
CONSCIOUS of the fact that Europe 
can be built only by concrete actions 
which create a real solidarity and by 
the establishment of common bases 
for economic development; DESIROUS 
of assisting through the expansion of 
their basic production in raising the 
standard of living and in furthering the 
works of peace; RESOLVED to substitute 
for historic rivalries a fusion of their 
essential interests; to establish, by 
creating an economic community, the 
foundation of a broad and independent 
community among peoples long divided 
by bloody conflicts; and to lay the 
bases of institutions capable of giving 
direction to their future common 
destiny.
  The Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community (1951); 
signed by the Governments of Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands
The “Commission” formed the central 
institutional expression of the ambitions 
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of this treaty: a supranational authority 
aiming to create an economic union as a 
transitional phase on the road to political 
union. 
The Treaty of Paris matters because it 
shows that very early on in the process 
of European integration “the spirit of 
peace” and “the spirit of creativity” were 
put side by side, and from very early 
on the idea of ‘Ever Closer Union’ was 
conceived as rooted in a commitment 
to peace but open to the ongoing 
creative project in the making, a gradual 
process towards political union but not 
a blueprint laying out a fixed path to 
that end. At the same time, the words of 
the preamble of the European Coal and 
Steel Community signify that this was a 
political project from the start, and those 
signing up to it, including the UK when 
it later joined the EEC, knew that from 
the beginning. Furthermore, the 1975 
information pamphlet the government of 
the day sent out before the referendum 
on the UK’s continued membership in the 
then European Community made it very 
explicit that its ambitions were more than 
economic. It is notable too, however, that 
the interpretation in the pamphlet of the 
phrase “Ever Closer Union” is implicitly 
that of a union of minds: 
The aims of the Common Market are: 
•  To bring together the peoples of 
Europe. 
•  To raise living standards and improve 
working conditions. 
•  To promote growth and boost world 
trade. 
•  To help the poorest regions of Europe 
and the rest of the world. 
•  To help maintain peace and freedom.
From a historical vantage point, then, 
“Ever Closer Union” should be understood 
processually. The idea of a “federalist” end 
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has been part of that processual political 
development and it remains a guiding light 
for many, but it cannot be seen to underlie 
all the political developments of the so-
far-attained initiatives and institutional 
arrangements. Europe’s nations have long 
been concerned with the transition of 
Europe from a condition of war to one 
of lasting peace; and the institutional 
expression of this has fluctuated between 
an ambition for a union of governments 
and a movement away from something 
(war), and towards each other (friendship, 
solidarity) in a union of minds. It certainly 
is, however, a political project away 
from exclusive national sovereignty, be 
that through the Single Market or other 
forms of European integration; but it 
has not always been understood as a 
movement towards exclusive international 
sovereignty. 
It is important to see, therefore, that the 
vision of “Ever Closer Union” has altered 
over time, and it means what it does 
today because of the plethora of things 
that Member States have up until now 
managed to do together, and the new 
conditions that this has produced. 
One of the features of this history, 
however, is that while it was, from the 
start, a political project, its results, both its 
achievements and its problems, seem not 
to have been widely or profoundly felt 
by the wider population of the Member 
States until the 1990s. At that point, 
both the federalist and single-market 
conceptions of the idea of “Ever Closer 
Union” began to intensify and circulate 
more widely – and neither found much 
enthusiasm from Europe’s publics.  
The effort to create a European “demos” 
and the propensity to concretise what 
the phrase “really” means may even have 
helped create polarization. As part of  
the renegotiation the UK projected a 
certain reading of “Ever Closer Union”, 
and decided to disengage from that. 
However, this tends only to confirm that 
the attained conditions of union and 
political perceptions at any given time 
matter more than any supposed intrinsic 
meaning of the phrase, and belong to 
an ongoing history of an unpredictable 
development.
the attained conditions of 
union and political perceptions 
at any given time matter more 
than any supposed intrinsic 
meaning of the phrase, 
and belong to an ongoing 
history of an unpredictable 
development. 
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Much UK media coverage – even some 
in popular media – is, in fact, very good. 
However, at times it has played a decisive 
and largely negative role in how the 
European Union is perceived in British 
society. It is equally clear that they devote 
very little actual attention (positive or 
negative) to the issue of “Ever Closer 
Union”. The main thing the UK media 
do with regard to the European Union 
is explaining why it is or isn’t necessary 
in the first place. They seldom go into 
philosophical or historical discussions 
on the ideational features of European 
integration. This likely has its cause in the 
reasons why the UK joined the EU in the 
first place. Unlike the original six founding 
countries it did not grapple with the 
trauma of occupation during or guilt for 
World War II, it was not recovering from 
Fascism like Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
or from Communism like the countries of 
Central-Eastern Europe. The reasons for 
the UK’s original accession were arguably 
much more pragmatic, and the dominant 
media narratives concern themselves 
largely with practical not ideational 
questions. 
On the other hand, the UK media 
representation of the European Union 
does foreground the “threat” of a 
European political project as intrinsically 
ideological, hegemonic, and supra-
nationalist in intent. While the Treaty of 
Lisbon may point in that direction, the 
direction of travel is complicated by the 
increasing significance and presence of 
“intergovernmental” structures, especially 
the powerful role of the European Council 
– although that body operates by qualified 
majority vote, and may be thought anyway 
to give Germany a power position that is 
neither federalist nor intergovernmental. 
While the subsidiarity formula, “National 
where possible, European when 
necessary”, is hardly recognized by the 
media in Britain, that may also reflect the 
5.   The UK Media
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fact that, as the European Commission 
President has admitted, there have been 
shortfalls in its application.
One reason for the characteristically 
negative representation of the EU in the 
British media may be that media outlets 
typically turn away from their specialist 
correspondents at times of EU “drama”. 
This results in a tendency to oversimplify or 
even completely avoid reporting at a time 
when knowledge and experience is needed 
most. For example, the BBC was the only 
major EU public broadcaster in Europe 
not to air the debate between the (in any 
case controversial) European Commission 
Presidential candidates in 2014. In a certain 
way the British media simply reflected 
the lack of understanding and interest in 
the EU, and not only in Britain: polling 
showed that 90% of voters throughout the 
EU had never heard of the pan-European 
parties involved or of the EU Commission 
candidates. The story that the BBC and 
most of the rest of the British media 
focused on was the rise of UKIP.
This vicious circle is especially exemplified 
in the tabloid press. However, it is clear 
that this part of the British media does not 
have a monopoly on public opinion, and 
the BBC remains the most powerful media 
outlet in the country. 
One feature of the media in the UK that 
needs to be highlighted is the extent to 
which it is no longer simply a UK media. 
The digital revolution in the 21st century 
has brought people closer, not just within 
Europe, but also beyond. Both the internet 
and non-national TV has led to a closer 
cultural “union” of people and peoples 
than could have been envisioned by the 
founding fathers of the EU – although 
it is now not a fundamentally European 
community of “friends”. The closer union 
of peoples of Europe must therefore be 
put into the context of the increasing 
globalisation of media and social media 
services and the increasing ease with 
which we communicate transnationally. 
Young people today are more closely 
connected over national borders through 
the internet and through media culture. 
This makes transnational communication 
immediate and accessible to almost all, 
and globally, not just regionally. Social 
media does, of course, have a remarkable 
tendency to polarise discussions, and 
is as likely to provoke discussion about 
national identity (and its fragility in an 
international environment) as it is likely 
to provoke “cosmopolitan” feelings of 
international belonging. Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt that many people today, 
especially young people, are less “rooted” 
in a national soil, and have an instinctive 
international sympathy not limited to (but 
not excluding) such unity “among the 
peoples of Europe”, in a sense of mutual 
understanding and respect.
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The third major theme of the discussion 
on the idea of “Ever Closer Union” 
was its importance in the context of 
the developing political formations in 
the European Parliament (EP). Like the 
media, the phrase is not itself the subject 
of discussion or debate, and it is likely 
that even if it were the views in the EP 
would be of marginal significance to the 
Brexit debate in the UK. Nevertheless, 
without being a theme for discussion the 
ideas that circulate around the phrase 
are a significant political touchstone 
for parliamentary politics on the EU 
level, which thereby take a distinctively 
different shape than the groupings in 
national parliaments. Indeed, along with 
the traditional Left/Right dichotomy, it 
is an axis of ideological divide in the EP 
chamber in a way it is nowhere else. The 
pro-federalist cluster, in particular, regard 
the phrase as belonging squarely within 
their own political purview, and a growing 
non-federalist group has developed as a 
consequence. The latter presently consists 
of about 160-180 MEPs out of a total of 
750, this includes the two largest British 
delegations: the Conservatives and UKIP. 
In the 2000s it was the former party that 
famously broke off from the federalist 
and centre-right European People’s Party 
grouping and formed a separate EP group, 
the European Conservatives and Reformists 
(ECR), opposed to federalism. From the 
perception of these MEPs, the European 
Parliament has been gradually assuming 
more and more powers, especially after 
the Lisbon Treaty (2007). Their frustration 
is that much greater, because anti-
federalist groups have found themselves 
outvoted in most debates in recent years. 
This has also made the cleavage between 
the federalists and non-federalists in the 
European Parliament that much more 
apparent, and there is no doubt that the 
phrase is a politically charged element in 
the formation of this divide. 
Playing this slightly “spectral” role in 
EU Parliamentary debates is in some 
respects internal to the set-up of the EP 
itself. That is, the fact that there have 
been very few explicit references to “Ever 
Closer Union” in the EP reflects the fact 
that its very proceedings can be framed 
as the practice of this idea: whether that 
is seen in terms of greater powers to 
the Parliament or simply the practical 
reality of a certain kind of sovereignty 
sharing. Relating back to the overarching 
processual interpretation of the phrase, 
one can say that its ongoing significance is 
inseparable from the actual and ongoing 
process of European governance, both 
6.  The European Parliament
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informing and being informed by the 
developmental conditions of attained co-
ordination and integration. On this view, 
a certain kind of opposition to the idea 
of “Ever Closer Union”, opposition, that 
is, which presupposes that it has a fixed 
teleological sense (an international state), 
is largely symbolic. This is especially true of 
the UK, which is (really is) a Member State 
of the EU but does not, and is not obliged 
to, participate entirely or at all in every 
political project that internationalises 
decision making powers. On one reading 
of this, it means that it has been taking 
part only partially and reluctantly in the 
process of “Ever Closer Union”. On another 
reading, however, it simply shows that this 
process is neither linear nor irrevocably 
directed towards a fixed internationalist or 
federalist objective. On the latter reading, 
the idea that there is fixed end-goal (telos) 
governing actual developments is doubted; 
rather there are procedures through which 
co-operation and co-ordination between 
states in different forms, including the 
delegation of competences to non-
national bodies, is enacted. The upcoming 
referendum in the UK is, however, putting 
pressure on governments and citizens in 
other member states explicitly to address 
the political goals of EU institutionalization 
of co-operation.
That issue is likely to reflect the changing 
perceptions over the course of the EU’s 
short history of the nature of the nation 
state discussed at the start of this report. Is 
the nation state itself a sovereign “beast” 
that needs taming, or are the crucial 
questions bound up with the form of 
government within such a state (a point 
which could suggest that the “beast” 
can just as well re-emerge in a sovereign 
international state)? It is not clear whether 
federalists today cleave still to the idea 
that the national form is the principal 
danger or have other reasons, such as the 
emergence of newly competitive large 
states, for favouring a supra-national 
order. Clear divisions remain between 
MEPs who go to Brussels/Strasbourg to 
further a federalist cause in the name 
of “Ever Closer Union”, and those who 
go there to secure national interests. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable 
consensus around the assumption that an 
international order based on democratic, 
prosperous, cooperating nation states is a 
powerful driver of peace and stability in 
Europe, and some among these will argue 
that limited sovereignty (all round) is a 
condition for this.
17LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe |
The last case-specific section of the hearing 
focused on the legal force of the phrase 
in EU Treaties and their interpretation 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
Luxembourg. The bottom line is that the 
phrase is not an explicit driver of the ECJ 
rulings, even if it has appeared in them 
from time to time. Specifically these were 
cases concerning the rights of individuals 
as derived from EU law as such, and not 
national law, which were accompanied by 
invoking the spirit of the Treaties, which 
is to say the idea “ever closer union of the 
peoples of Europe”. This took place only 
in order to vest individuals with rights as 
European citizens, and not to unilaterally 
further European integration. 
However, what drives the court is what 
it perceives to be the policy and purpose 
behind each and every Treaty article or set 
of articles. The same is true of particular 
legislative instruments of the EU as defined 
by the court in its rulings. Once again 
there was a question whether a sort of 
“spectral” presence of the phrase might 
inform judgements. Nevertheless, it was 
thought that had the Court been barred 
from using or even tacitly appealing to the 
phrase, it most likely would have reached 
the same conclusions in the 57 occasions 
when the words actually appeared in its 
rulings. (Note that this is 57 times out of a 
total of 29,969 rulings, and a further 554 
cases in which the Court refers either to 
the “closer union” objective or its spirit; 
House of Commons Briefing Paper No. 
07230, 16th November 2015).
The legal perspective also shows 
there have been many instances when 
differences among Member States on how 
European policy should be interpreted 
have been successfully accommodated. 
In this regard the EU has never been a 
one-size-fits-all operation, even before 
the subsequent Treaties that allowed for 
varied national paths and multi-speed 
formations within the EU umbrella. This 
historical background of EU law helps to 
see that nothing fundamental is changed 
by the UK’s 2016 renegotiation as far as 
the law is concerned. The changes certainly 
have political significance, but that 
significance lies primarily to the context of 
David Cameron’s decision to support UK’s 
continued membership.
7. The European Court of Justice
the EU has never been a one-
size-fits-all operation, even 
before the Treaties allowed 
for varied national paths and 
multi-speed formations within 
the EU umbrella
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The idea of “Ever Closer Union” has never 
had a single or fixed teleological sense 
which has driven the political project of 
co-ordination and co-operation between 
the nations of Europe who have joined the 
European Union, neither for the UK nor 
for the other Member States. Nevertheless, 
it is significant that the chapter of the 
renegotiation that contains a discussion 
of this phrase is entitled “Sovereignty”. 
In other words, it is an essentially political 
concept belonging to an essentially 
political project. And on this score, the 
idea of collective action is such that any 
member of a democratic club may help set 
the rules and their interpretation.
As a Member of the EU a state may both 
enhance the sovereignty it retains, and have 
a say in the development and powers of 
the club in those areas where sovereignty 
is shared or pooled. This political process in 
an ongoing political project is illustrated by 
what took place in the 2016 renegotiation, 
and includes what, if anything, is understood 
by the distinctive and ambiguous phrase 
“Ever closer union among the peoples  
of Europe”.
8. Conclusions
As a Member of the EU a 
state may both enhance the 
sovereignty it retains, and have 
a say in the development and 
powers of the club in those 
areas where sovereignty is 
shared or pooled
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